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The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) possesses the high-
est security among all practical quantum key distribution protocols. However, existing multi-
intensity decoy-state methods may cause loopholes when modulating light intensities with practical
devices. In this paper, we propose a passive decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol based on a novel struc-
ture of heralded single-photon sources. It does not need to modulate the light source into different
intensities and thus can avoid leaking modulation information of decoy states to eavesdroppers,
enhancing the security of practical MDI-QKD. Furthermore, by combining the passive decoy states
and biased basis choices, our protocol can exhibit distinct advantages compared with state-of-the
art MDI-QKD schemes even when the finite key-size effect is taken into account. Therefore, our
present passive decoy-state MDI-QKD seems a promising candidate for practical implementation of
quantum key distributions in the near future.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.65.Lm
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows legitimate users, Alice and Bob, to share secret keys under unprece-
dented level of security based on quantum mechanics. Its unconditional security has been proven with ideal devices
[3–5]. However, the device imperfections in reality offers opportunities for eavesdropper, Eve, to launch quantum
hacking [6–8]. Fortunately, some countermeasures are invented to fix these security loopholes, such as decoy-state
method [9–11] and measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [12, 13].
In most experimental demonstrations of decoy-state QKD [14–18], people actively modulate light sources into
different intensities with acousto- or electro-optic modulators. However, there may exist side-channel loopholes during
the intensity modulation processes. For example, when a modulator is not properly designed, some physical parameters
of the pulses emitted by the sender may depend on the particular setting selected [19, 20], causing severe security
problems. To reduce the information leakage, some passive decoy-state methods have been put forward [21–25] and
experimentally demonstrated [26–28].
However, in practical implementations of MDI-QKD [29–37], only active decoy-state methods are adopted. It is
mainly due to the fact that in most passive schemes the vacuum state cannot be directly observed and also hard to
precisely estimate with those observed data. To solve the problem, in this paper we propose an improved passive
decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. It is based on a novel structure of heralded single-photon sources (HSPS) presented
in our recent work [24, 27], by combining the idea of scaling in [37], we are able to give more precise parameter
estimations with the data that can be observed in experiment. Through carrying out full parameter optimizations,
we do investigation on its performance with finite-size-key effects. Corresponding simulation results demonstrate that
our present scheme can work more efficiently than state-of-the art decoy-state MDI-QKD scheme using WCS [34],
and can even show some advantages compared with the most advanced MDI-QKD scheme using HSPS [37].
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FIG. 1: The schematic of our passive decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. HSPS, heralded single-photon source; NC, nonlinear
crystal; DM, dichroic mirror; BS, beam splitter; PBS, polarization beam-splitter; PR, polarization rotator; D1 and D2, single-
photon detectors.
II. PASSIVE DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
Our passive decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol is presented in Fig. 1. At Alice’s (Bob’s) side, a time correlated pulse
pair from parametric down-conversion (PDC) process of nonlinear crystal is split into idler mode I and signal mode
S. The mode I is further split and then measured by two local detectors, while mode S is encoded conditionally on
the local detection events and sent to untrustworthy third party (UTP), Charlie, for bell state measurement (BSM).
The local detection events can be divided into four kinds, denoted as Vi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4): (1) Non-clicking; (2) Single
clicking at D1; (3) Single clicking at D2; (4) Clicking at both D1 and D2. These events Vi correspond to projected
state l (l = w, x, y, z) of mode S in the photon-number space. In our protocol, when Vi event happens, the signal
mode S will be encoded on specific basis, i.e., state w and x are only prepared in X basis while state y and z only
prepared in Z basis. The data on X basis is used to estimate channel parameter, and the data on Z basis is used to
distill keys. The nomenclature and corresponding relationship is shown in Table I.
TABLE I: The nomenclature and corresponding relationship in our protocol.
Events State Probability Encoding basis
V1 w P
w
n X
V2 x P
x
n X
V3 y P
y
n Z
V4 z P
z
n Z
Condition on event Vi, the mode S is projected into the photon-number space ρl =
∑
n P
l
n|n〉〈n|, and the photon
number statistics can be expressed as [24]
P ln = Pn
∑
s1s2
PVi|s1s2Ps1s2|n, (1)
where Pn is the photon-number distribution of PDC process; Ps1s2|n denotes the projecting probability of n-photon
state passing through the BS and being projected into state |s1s2〉; PVi|s1s2 denotes the probability of an Vi event
given a projected state |s1s2〉. Note that Pn can be certain distribution of PDC process, here we assume a Poisson
distribution, i.e., Pn =
µn
n! e
−µ, where µ is the mean photon number of idler mode or signal mode. Besides, all PVi|s1s2
3are listed in Table II, while Ps1s2|n is given by [24]
Ps1s2|n =
n∑
k=0
n−k∑
s2=0
k∑
s1=0
n!tk(1− t)
n−k
ηs11 η
s2
2 (1− η1)
k−s1 (1− η2)
n−k−s2
s1!s2! (k − s1)! (n− k − s2)!
, (2)
where t represents the transmission efficiency of the BS, reasonably assume t ∈ (0, 12 ); η1 and η2 denote the overall
efficiency of each branch in the idler mode respectively, which includes the detection efficiency but excludes the
transmission efficiency of the BS (t); d1 and d2 refer to the dark count rate of D1 and D2.
TABLE II: Probability of the Vi event occurring.
Case PV1|s1s2 PV2|s1s2 PV3|s1s2 PV4|s1s2
s1 = 0, s2 = 0 (1− d1)(1− d2) d1(1− d2) d2(1− d1) d1d2
s1 6= 0, s2 = 0 0 1− d2 0 d2
s1 = 0, s2 6= 0 0 0 1− d1 d1
s1 6= 0, s2 6= 0 0 0 0 1
In the MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob simultaneously send photon pulses to the UTP. When Alice sends state l and
and Bob sends state r (l, r ∈ {w, x, y, z}), we can obtain the gains Slr =
∑
j,k>0 a
l
jb
r
kYjk, and quantum bit errors
Tlr =
∑
j,k>0 a
l
jb
r
kYjkejk. Here a
l
j and b
r
k are the probability distribution as presented in Eq. (1) at Alice’s side and
Bob’s side, respectively. Yjk and ejk each denotes the yield and the error rate when Alice sends a j-photon state
and Bob sends a k-photon state. The average quantum-bit error-rate (QBER) is given by Elr = Tlr/Slr. From Ref.
[24, 29], we know that former formulae used to estimate the yield and error rate of single-photon pair in X basis are
Y
X,L
11 =
ax1b
x
2
(
Sww −H
)
− aw1 b
w
2
(
Sxx −H
′
)
aw1 a
x
1(b
w
1 b
x
2 − b
x
1b
w
2 )
, e
X,U
11 =
Tww −
1
2H
aw1 b
w
1 Y
X,L
11
, (3)
where H ≡ aw0 b
w
0 Y00 +
∑∞
m=1 (a
w
0 b
w
mY0m + a
w
mb
w
0 Ym0), H
′ ≡ ax0b
x
0Y00 +
∑∞
m=1 (a
x
0b
x
mY0m + a
x
mb
x
0Ym0); L and U refer
to the lower bound and upper bound, respectively. Besides, we denote overline and underline as the experimental
values with statistical fluctuation. For example, for experimental value of Sww, it satisfies Sww := Sww−∆1 6 S˜ww 6
Sxx := Sxx +∆2 with a failure probability ε, where ∆1 and ∆2 are the statistical fluctuation values.
However, in fact, the experimental values related to vacuum state presented in Eq. (3), i.e., H and H′, cannot be
directly measured in our passive MDI-QKD protocol. Fortunately, we can borrow the idea in [37] to reformulate Eq.
(3) as
Y˜
X,L
11 (H˜) =
ax1b
x
2Sww − a
w
1 b
w
2 Sxx − a
x
1b
x
2H˜
aw1 a
x
1(b
w
1 b
x
2 − b
x
1b
w
2 )
, (4)
and
e˜
X,U
11 (H˜) =
Tww −
1
2H˜
aw1 b
w
1 Y˜
X,L
11 (H˜)
. (5)
where H˜ is the value of H, which is a joint parameter existing in Y11 and e11. According to the e˜
X,U
11 (H˜) in Eq. (5),
we can obviously have the range of H˜ as
H˜ ∈
[
0, 2Tww
]
. (6)
In our protocol, we use the data in X basis to estimate the channel parameters in Z basis (Y Z11 and e
ph
11 ), but their
real values in Z basis may deviate from the quantities in X basis. Therefore, a stricter treatment should be taken
here. We use
−∆′1 6 Y
Z
11(H˜)− Y˜
X,L
11 (H˜) 6 ∆
′
2, (7)
−∆′′1 6 e
ph
11 (H˜)− e˜
X,U
11 (H˜) 6 ∆
′′
2 , (8)
for the worst-case values of Y Z,L11 (H˜) and e
ph,U
11 (H˜) with a failure probability.
4With the above formulae, we shall estimate the worst-case result for the key rate by scanning all possible values of
H˜ given in Eq. (6), and get the final key generation rate per pulse as
R > min
H˜
R(H˜) =
{
a
y
1b
y
1Y
Z,L
11 (H˜)
[
1−H2
(
e
ph,U
11 (H˜)
)]
− SZyyfH2
(
EZyy
)}
−
1
Nt
(
log2
8
ǫcor
+ 2log2
2
ε′εˆ
+ 2log2
1
εPA
)
,
(9)
where f is the inefficiency of error correction; H2(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p) is the binary Shannon entropy
function. The second part of Eq. (9) is due to other finite size effects on the key rate as defined in [32], guaranteeing
the composable security of whole MDI-QKD system. Note that here we only use the state y conditional on event V3
to generate keys. Though we can also use state z to distill keys, our numerical simulation shows that it raise the key
rate little because the probability of event V4 is very low compared with event V3.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the following, we carry out numerical simulations for our proposed passive decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. Here,
we focus on the symmetric case, which means that Charlie is at the middle of Alice and Bob, and all other device
parameters of Alice’s side and Bob’s side are identical. Let d1 = d2 = dA and η1 = η2 = ηA, we can obtain the
simplified photon-number distribution for aln, b
r
n (l, r ∈ {w, x, y, z}) as
Pwn = (1 − dA)
2(1− ηA)
n µ
n
n! e
−µ,
P xn = (1− dA)(1 − ηA)
n
[(
1−(1−t)ηA
1−ηA
)n
+ dA − 1
]
µn
n! e
−µ,
P yn = (1− dA)(1 − ηA)
n
[(
1−tηA
1−ηA
)n
+ dA − 1
]
µn
n! e
−µ,
P zn =
µn
n! e
−µ − Pwn − P
x
n − P
y
n .
(10)
Here, the Eq. (10) needs to satisfy the condition
Px
n
Pw
n
>
Px
2
Pw
2
>
Px
1
Pw
1
for n > 3 to let Eq. (4) hold, and the proof of this
condition has been given in [24].
TABLE III: The device parameters used in our numerical simulations. e0, the error rate of vacuum pulses; ed, the misalignment
error; ηA and dA, the overall efficiency and the dark count rate of the local detector at Alice (or Bob)’s side; ηC and dC each
corresponds to the detection efficiency and the dark count rate of detectors at the Charlie’s side; f , the inefficiency of error
correction.
e0 ed ηA dA ηC dC f
0.5 1.5% 75% 10−6 40% 10−7 1.16
In our simulation, we use the commonly used loss coefficient of 0.2 dB/km, and other device parameters are listed
in Table III. We make comparisons between our present work and other two representative active MDI-QKD schemes
[34, 37], in which Ref. [37] is the best active MDI-QKD scheme so far. Furthermore, due to the finite-size key effect,
we adopt the same statistical fluctuation method (normal distribution given the failure probability ε = 10−7) and
composable security level as in [37]. Besides, we perform full parameter optimization for all schemes in comparisons.
In our protocol, it includes mean photon number µ, transmission efficiency t of the local BS, and the joint parameter
H˜. The comparisons are shown in Figs. 2 ∼ 4.
We first plot the comparisons for two key channel parameters, i.e., the yield and the phase-flip error rate of single-
photon pairs, between our protocol and other two schemes in Fig. 2. Here the data size of the pulse number each
side sends is reasonably set as Nt = 10
9. Fig. 2 (a) shows that Y11 is estimated more accurately in our passive
protocol than other two active schemes, which mainly attributes to that the local detection structure provides some
photon-number-resolution ability, while Fig. 2 (b) shows the estimated eph11 of our protocol is in the middle of other
two schemes. Finally, the comparisons of key rates for different schemes are illustrated in Fig. 3. It shows that our
protocol always outperforms Ref. [34] at this data size, and will be advantageous at a relatively longer transmission
distance compared with Ref. [37], i.e., > 30 km.
Besides, we also investigate the key generation rate changing with the variation of the data size at fixed transmission
distance (50 km), as shown in Fig. 4. From Fig. 4, we find that our present work has cross points with the other two
state-of-the art MDI-QKD works using either WCS and HSPS, and show best performance at small data size, e.g.,
Nt 6 4×10
9. Compared with Ref. [34], the improvement mainly due to the inherent merit of the sources as explained
in Ref. [38]. However, even when using the same light sources, HSPS, our work can still exhibit less sensitivity than
Ref. [37], making it very promising candidate for practical applications.
50.00
0.04
0.08
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.06
0.12
0.18
0.24(b)
 
 
Y
11
 Ref. [36]
 Ref. [39]
 Our work
(a)
 
 
ep
h 11
Transmission distance (km)
FIG. 2: The single-photon-pair yield (Y11) and phase-flip error rate (e
ph
11
) of different schemes. Here the data size Nt = 10
9.
0 20 40 60 80 100
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
 
 
R
Transmission distance (km)
 Ref. [36]
 Ref. [39]
 Our work
FIG. 3: The key rates of our scheme and other two reports at data size Nt = 10
9.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we propose a passive decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol, which is impossible for Eve to distinguish
between decoy and signal states, enhancing the security of MDI-QKD. The passive decoy states conditional on local
events combining the biased basis choice and the idea of scaling in [37] are adopted to estimate channel parameters
more accurately. Furthermore, we perform full parameter optimization for our protocol, and simulation results show
that our protocol can show some advantages even compared with some state-of-the art MDI-QKD schemes, especially
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FIG. 4: The key rates of different schemes versus data size at 50 km.
at a longer distance or a smaller data size. Hence, our present work provides an alternative and useful approach to
improve both the security and practicability of MDI-QKD protocols, and represents a further step along practical
implementations of quantum key distributions.
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